UGC NET ECONOMICS · 2022 · UNIT 1
Micro Economics PYQs
व्यष्टि अर्थशास्त्र के प्रश्न
December2021/June2022 merged · 8October2022
दिसंबर2021/जून2022 संयुक्त · 8अक्टूबर2022
Consumer behaviour
उपभोक्ता व्यवहार
Question 5 / प्रश्न 5
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If the income effect for a good is in the opposite direction as the substitution effect, but the substitution effect dominates then the good is
income effect substitution effect केविरुद्ध हो लेकिन substitution dominant होतो good?
(a) Normal।
(b) Inferior लेकिन Giffen नहीं।
(c) Giffen।
(d) कोई नहीं।
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (b) Inferior लेकिन Giffen नहीं।
Explanation: The opposing income effect makes the good inferior; substitution dominance prevents Giffen behaviour.
व्याख्या: Inferior good का income effect price cut के substitution effect केविरुद्ध है। Substitution dominates तो total own price effect normal downward रहता है; Giffen में adverse income effect dominates होगा।
Question 14 / प्रश्न 14
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Which of the followings are assumptions of ordinal utility analysis? A. Consumers are consistent in their preferences B. Consumer can measure the total utility received from any given basket of goods C. Consumer preferences follow transitivity D. Consumers are non-satiated with respect to goods they confront E. Consumers are irrational
Ordinal preferences: A consistency; B cardinal total utility measurement; C transitivity; D nonsatiation; E irrationality।
(a) B, C, D केवल
(b) C, D, E केवल
(c) A, C, D केवल
(d) A, B, C केवल
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (c) A, C, D केवल
Explanation: Ordinal analysis requires consistent/transitive preferences and usual nonsatiation, not cardinal utility measurement.
व्याख्या: A C D usual ordinal-demand assumptions हैं। Utility numbers preference ordering represent करते हैं; psychological utility units cardinal measure करना जरूरी नहीं।
Question 30 / प्रश्न 30
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If the demand function is: P = 35 – 2x – x2 and the demand x0 is 3. What will be the consumer's surplus?
Inverse demand P=35−2q−q², q3 में consumer surplus?
(a) 27
(b) 25
(c) 60
(d) 20
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (a) 27
Explanation: Willingness-to-pay area87minus actual spending60 gives consumer surplus27.
व्याख्या: P(3)=20। Area∫₀³(35−2q−q²)dq=105−9−9=87। Actual spend20×3=60; CS=87−60=27।
Market structure and pricing
बाजार संरचना और मूल्य निर्धारण
Question 18 / प्रश्न 18
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Suppose a profit maximising monopolist is producing 800 units of output and is chargin a price of Rs. 40 per unit. If the elasticity of demand for the product is –2, marginal cost of the last unit produced is ______
Monopoly P40, elasticity−2, output800 में optimum MC?
(a) 10
(b) –400
(c) –2
(d) 20
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (d) 20
Explanation: MC=MR=40(1−1/2)=20.
व्याख्या: MR=P(1+1/ε)=40(1−.5)=20। Interior profit optimum MR=MC, इसलिए MC20। Output800 इस mark up calculation में needed नहीं।
Question 61 / प्रश्न 61
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The total revenue R and total cost C function of a firm are given by R = 30Q – Q2, C = 20 + 4Q. Where Q is output find the equilibrium output of the firm
TR30q−q², TC20+4q में equilibrium output?
(a) 4
(b) 13
(c) 15
(d) 10
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (b) 13
Explanation: MR=30−2q=MC4givesq13.
व्याख्या: Profit26q−q²−20; derivative26−2q=0 ⇒q13। MR30−2q=4=MC और second derivative−2 confirms maximum।
Welfare and equilibrium
कल्याण और संतुलन
Question 24 / प्रश्न 24
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Which of the following conditions prevail in the long run equilibrium of industry for achieving optional resource allocation A. The output is produced at the minimum feasible cost B Comsumer pays the minimum possible price which just covers the marginal cost of the producer C. Plants are used at full capacity in long run D. Firms earn supernormal profits E. Perfect competitive firms and price mechanism operates Q
Competitive long run optimum: A minimum cost; B P=MC=min AC; C efficient plant capacity; D supernormal profits; E competitive price mechanism।
(a) A, B, C और E केवल
(b) C, D और E केवल
(c) B, D और E केवल
(d) A, B और E केवल
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (a) A, B, C और E केवल
Explanation: The standard free-entry equilibrium has zero economic profit and P=MC=min AC.
व्याख्या: Free entry homogeneous competitive benchmark में economic profit zero और P=MC=min AC होता है। इस setting में A B C E relevant; monopoly/externalities या incomplete markets हों तो resource efficiency automatic नहीं।
Question 44 / प्रश्न 44
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Match List I with List II.
Concepts match करें।
| ListI सूचीI |
ListII सूचीII |
|---|---|
| A Greatestgood/greatestnumber अधिकतमलोगोंकाअधिकतमहित |
I Lernerindex लर्नरसूचक |
| B Equilibriumstability संतुलनस्थिरता |
II Benthamcriterion बेंथममानदंड |
| C Monopolypower एकाधिकारशक्ति |
III Tâtonnement टटोनमां |
| D third degree discrimination तृतीयमूल्यविभेद |
IV Pigou पिगू |
(a) IV III I II
(b) IV III II I
(c) II III I IV
(d) II III I IV
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: दोनों (c),(d)
Explanation: The correct code is duplicated in(c)and(d); there is no unique letter.
व्याख्या: Correct matching AII BIII CI DIV है। Source(c),(d) identical print हैं, इसलिए unique letter नहीं। Lerner(P−MC)/P market power measure है।
Question 56 / प्रश्न 56
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Which is not a marginal condition for Pareto optimality?
Pareto optimality की कौनसी marginal condition गलत है?
(a) MRSᴬxy=MRSᴮxy=px/py
(b) MRTSˣLK=MRTSʸLK=w/r
(c) MRSᴬxy=MRSᴮxy=MRPTxy
(d) MRSTᴷxy=MRPTᴸxy=w/r
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (d) MRSTᴷxy=MRPTᴸxy=w/r
Explanation: Goods substitution/transformation rates cannot be equated directly with the input-price ratio.
व्याख्या: Exchange:MRSᴬ=MRSᴮ=pₓ/pᵧ; production:MRTSˣ=MRTSʸ=w/r; productmix:MRS=MRPT। Goods-substitution/transformation rates को factor price ratio w/r से directly equal करना (d) गलत है।
Question 59 / प्रश्न 59
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Which of the followings are correct? A. The market is a system that works with price mechanism B. Market failure refers to the divergence of market equilibrium from pareto optamality C. Market fails to effieciently supply public goods and the same makes a case for govt intervention D. Market efficiently works in the presence of positive externalities E. Market efficiently works in the presence of negative externatlities
Markets: A price mechanism; B failure=Pareto divergence; C public goods failure intervention case; D positive externality में efficiency; E negative externality में efficiency।
(a) A, B, C और D केवल
(b) A, B और C केवल
(c) C, D और E केवल
(d) B और E केवल
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (b) A, B और C केवल
Explanation: Unpriced public-good and externality effects can make market equilibria inefficient.
व्याख्या: A B C सही। Unpricedexternalities private/social marginal cost benefit अलग करती हैं, इसलिए D/E generally false। Intervention case होना हर intervention automatically efficient होने की guarantee नहीं।
Production and costs
उत्पादन और लागत
Question 51 / प्रश्न 51
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Maximise Q=f(L, K) subject to C=w L+r K. A f L/f K=w/r; B f LL>0, f KK>0; C f LL<0, f KK>0; D f LL<0, f KK<0; E f LL f KK>(f LK)².
Fixed cost budget पर output max: A MPᴸ/MPᴷ=w/r; B own second derivatives positive; C mixed signs; D both negative; E Hessian determinant positive।
(a) A, B और E केवल
(b) A, D और E केवल
(c) A और E केवल
(d) A और B केवल
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: sufficient conditions में
Explanation: A, D, E provide sufficient strict-concavity conditions; full negative definiteness is not necessary on a constrained tangent.
व्याख्या: A interior FOC है। D/E Hessian negative definite बना कर sufficientstrictmaximum देते हैं। Fixed linear constraint पर exact SOC tangent direction में d′Hd<0 है; full negative-definite Hessian necessary नहीं, जैसे degree1Cobb Douglas का determinants0 भी constrained maximum देता है।
Question 82 / प्रश्न 82
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Two factors of production, say A and B have the same price. The least cost combination of A and B for producing given level of output will be achieved at a point where the Iso-quant has slope equal to
Equal factor prices पर interior least cost isoquant slope?
(a) 0
(b) 1
(c) –1
(d) 2
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (c) –1
Explanation: Equal input prices imply signed interior isoquant slope−1.
व्याख्या: MRTS=price factor A/price factor B=1, magnitude; signed isoquant slope−1 है। Tangency smooth interior optimum को assume करती है।
Game theory
खेल सिद्धांत
Question 75 / प्रश्न 75
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The strategy of choosing the policy which has the best possible outcome is known as _____
Best possible payoff को maximum करने का optimistic criterion?
(a) Dominantstrategy।
(b) Maximax।
(c) Minimax।
(d) Maximin।
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (b) Maximax।
Explanation: Maximax chooses the best of each action’s best possible outcomes.
व्याख्या: Maximax प्रत्येक action काबेस्ट outcome लेकरउनमें highest चुनता है। Maxi min worst outcomes में best चुनता है; दोनों decision criteria अलग हैं।
December2022 · 2March2023 · ShiftI
दिसंबर2022 · 2मार्च2023 · पालीI
Consumer behaviour
उपभोक्ता व्यवहार
Question 1 / प्रश्न 1
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Which of the followins is not true in case of indifference curves?
Indifference curves पर कौन statement गलत ?
(a) Usualconvexcurves।
(b) Perfectcomplementsrightangles।
(c) Perfectsubstitutesstraightline।
(d) हर normalgoodpairstraightline।
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (d) हर normalgoodpairstraightline।
Explanation: Normality is an income-effect property and does not imply straight-line indifference curves.
व्याख्या: Normality income effect की property है; perfect substitutability नहीं। इसलिए normal goods के IC necessarily straight नहीं। Usual strictly convex preferences में bowed curves मिलती हैं।
Question 4 / प्रश्न 4
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The condition of preferring a risky income to a certain income with the same expected value is referred as.
Same expected income पर risky option को certain income से prefer करना ?
(a) Riskaverse।
(b) Riskloving।
(c) Risk neutral।
(d) Riskpremium।
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (b) Riskloving।
Explanation: A risk lover prefers an appropriate lottery over its certain mean.
व्याख्या: Risk loving preferences में convex utility relevant lottery पर E[u(Y)]>u(EY) देसकती है। Risk neutral indifferent और risk averse certain mean prefer करता है।
Question 15 / प्रश्न 15
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The demand function for Good A is given by QA = 100 – 2 PA + 0.2Y + 0.3 PB. Find the cross- price elasticities of demand at PA = 6, Y = 500, PB = 10.
Qᴬ=100−2Pᴬ+.2Y+.3Pᴮ, Pᴬ6, Y500, Pᴮ10 में cross price elasticity?
(a) 0.06
(b) 0.016
(c) 0.52
(d) – 0.06
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (b) 0.016
Explanation: Quantity191 gives cross elasticity.3×10/191≈.016.
व्याख्या: Q=100−12+100+3=191। εAB=(∂QA/∂PB)PB/QA=.3×10/191≈.01571≈.016। Positive cross elasticity substitutes दर्शाती है।
Question 66 / प्रश्न 66
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Match List I with List II.
Risk/information concepts match करें।
| ListI सूचीI |
ListII सूचीII |
|---|---|
| A Additionalrisk-returntradeoff अतिरिक्तजोखिम-प्रतिफलविनिमय |
I Riskyasset जोखिमपूर्णपरिसंपत्ति |
| B Ownershipvaluation स्वामित्वमूल्यांकन |
II Moral hazard नैतिकसंकट |
| C Uncertainassetflow अनिश्चितपरिसंपत्तिप्रवाह |
III Priceofrisk जोखिमकीकीमत |
| D Hiddenaction/paymentprobability छिपीक्रिया-भुगतानप्रायिकता |
IV Endowmenteffect संपदाप्रभाव |
(a) A-I, B-IV, C-III, D-I
(b) A-III, B-IV, C-I, D-II
(c) A-III, B-IV, C-II, D-I
(d) A-I, B-II, C-III, D-IV
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (b) A-III, B-IV, C-I, D-II
Explanation: The matches distinguish the risk-return tradeoff, ownership bias, risky assets, and hidden actions.
व्याख्या: AIII BIV CI DII intended。 Risk price के unitsconventionexpectedreturnperunitrisk या inverse होनास्पष्ट चाहिए; ownership bias endowment और hiddenactionmoralhazard हैं।
Production and costs
उत्पादन और लागत
Question 2 / प्रश्न 2
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Which is not true at a smooth interior producer equilibrium?
Interior producer tangency में कौन equation गलत ?
(a) MPᴸ/MPᴷ=w/r
(b) MRTSᴸᴷ=MPᴸ/MPᴷ=w/r
(c) MPᴸ/w=MPᴷ/r
(d) MRTSᴸᴷ=r/w
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (d) MRTSᴸᴷ=r/w
Explanation: Interior tangency requires MRTS=w/r, not its reciprocal.
व्याख्या: MRTSᴸᴷ=MPᴸ/MPᴷ=w/r; equivalent MPᴸ/w=MPᴷ/r। (d) reciprocalr/w लगाता है। Kink/corner solutions में smooth tangency जरूरी नहीं।
Question 5 / प्रश्न 5
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________arises when the firm can produce any combination of two outputs more cheaply than could two independent firms that each produced a single output.
Joint production separate firms से cheaper होतो?
(a) Learningcurve।
(b) Economiesofscale।
(c) Diseconomies।
(d) Economiesofscope।
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (d) Economiesofscope।
Explanation: Scope economies mean joint production costs less than separate production.
व्याख्या: Scope condition C(q₁, q₂)<C(q₁,0)+C(0, q₂)। Scale एक outputbundle का size बढ़ानेक acosteffect है; scope productmix sharing का।
Question 18 / प्रश्न 18
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Find the Elasticity of Substitution (σ) of constant elaticity of substitution (CES) production function. When the substitution parameter (ρ) lies between 0 < r < ∞.
CES negative-exponentparameterisation मेंρ>0 तोσ?
(a) 1 सेअधिक।
(b) 1 सेकम।
(c) Infinite।
(d) 1।
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (b) 1 सेकम।
Explanation: In the negative-power CES convention,σ=1/(1+ρ)<1forρ>0.
व्याख्या: Q=[a K^(−ρ)+(1−a)L^(−ρ)]^(−1/ρ) में σ=1/(1+ρ)। ρ>0 पर 0<σ<1। Positivepowerparameterisation में sign convention बदलती है; functional form बताना जरूरी है।
Game theory
खेल सिद्धांत
Question 3 / प्रश्न 3
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A game in which the gains or losses of one player or firm do not come at the expenses of or provide equal benefit to the other player or firm, is known as________.
एक player कागेनदूसरेके equaloss केबराबर जरूरी नहोतो?
(a) Zerosum।
(b) Non zero sum।
(c) Mixedstrategyonly।
(d) Balancedgame।
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (b) Non zero sum।
Explanation: In non-zero-sum games, total payoffs can vary with the strategy profile.
व्याख्या: Non zero sum में sum of payoffs strategy profile के साथबदलसकता है; mutual gain या mutual loss possible है। Mixed strategies randomness की अलग property है।
Question 41 / प्रश्न 41
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Nash equilibrium represents. A. The outcome each time the game is played B. Long-run equilibrium C. A situation in which one player will not deviate, given the strategy of other player D. Best response of the first mover E. The pair of dominated strategies
Nash: A हर play काअनिवार्य outcome; B long run interpretation; C rival strategy given कोई profitable deviation नहीं; D first mover only; E dominated pair।
(a) A, B और C केवल
(b) B और D केवल
(c) B और C केवल
(d) A, C और D केवल
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
Explanation: Mutual best responses define Nash; long-run convergence requires a separate adjustment model.
व्याख्या: Nash mutual best responses है, इसलिए C। B some learning models का long run interpretation है, definition नहीं; stability/convergence automatic नहीं। No C-only option है, इसलिए source(c)B+C को qualified पढ़ें।
Market structure and pricing
बाजार संरचना और मूल्य निर्धारण
Question 6 / प्रश्न 6
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In which oligopoly model, firms produce homogenous goods and each firm treats the price of its competitors as fixed and all firms decide simultaneously, what price to change?
Homogeneous goods, simultaneous price choice, rival price given कौन model?
(a) Betrand model
(b) Cournot model
(c) Stackelberg model
(d) Sweezy model
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (a) Betrand model
Explanation: Bertrand firms choose prices simultaneously; Cournot firms choose quantities.
व्याख्या: Bertrand price competition है। Cournot quantity choice और Stackelberg sequential leadership है। Standard identical constant MC, no-capacity constraints में Bertrand P=MC outcome देता है।
Question 61 / प्रश्न 61
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Which of the following are true for an oligopolistic market? A. The demand curve of oligopolistic market is indeterminate. B. There is a possibility of only two sellers. C. The product may be homogenous or differentiated. D. There is free entry into and free exist out of the market. E. There is an importance of advertisement cost.
Oligopoly: A strategic demand indeterminate; B duopoly possible; C homogeneous/differentiated; D free entry; E advertising important।
(a) A, B, C और D केवल
(b) B, C और D केवल
(c) A, B, C और E केवल
(d) B, C, D E केवल
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (c) A, B, C और E केवल
Explanation: Oligopoly permits duopoly, differentiation, and advertising, but usually has entry barriers.
व्याख्या: A B C E typical features हैं। Rivalreactions केबिना unique firm demand curve तय नहीं होती। D barriers-to-entry वाले usual oligopoly model सेविरोधी है।
Question 73 / प्रश्न 73
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Match List I with List II.
Industrial organisation theories match करें।
| ListI सूचीI |
ListII सूचीII |
|---|---|
| A SCPapproach संरचनाआचरणप्रदर्शन |
I James Buchanan बुकानन |
| B Transactioncost लेनदेनलागत |
II Newclassicaltheory नवक्लासिकीसिद्धांत |
| C Publicchoice सार्वजनिकचयन |
III HHIndex एचएचसूचकांक |
| D “Industrialconnection” printed औद्योगिकसंबंध |
IV Williamson विलियमसन |
(a) A-II, B-IV, C-I, D-III
(b) A-III, B-IV, C-II, D-I
(c) A-I, B-III, C-IV, D-II
(d) A-IV, B-II, C-I, D-III
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: exact matching नहीं
Explanation: SCP is not New Classical macro theory, and“connection”is not concentration; the matching is defective.
व्याख्या: BIV और CI reliable हैं। HHI industrial CONCENTRATION measure है, connection नहीं। SCP Mason–Bain structural tradition सेजुड़ता है, macro New Classical theory से नहीं। Source(a)के लिए AII/DIII कोअर्थबदलकर सही नमानें।
Welfare and equilibrium
कल्याण और संतुलन
Question 14 / प्रश्न 14
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If the demand and supply functions are given Pd = 20-5x and Ps = 4x + 8; obtain Prodcuer’s surplus
Demand20−5q, supply4q+8 में producer surplus?
(a) 31/9
(b) 32/9
(c) 129/9
(d) 29/9
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (b) 32/9
Explanation: Equilibriumq4/3andp40/3give producer surplus32/9.
व्याख्या: Equilibrium20−5q=4q+8 ⇒q4/3, p40/3। PS triangle½×(4/3)×(40/3−8)=32/9।
Question 36 / प्रश्न 36
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Which of the following is true in the case of externality?
Externality concept किस sense मेंसमझें?
(a) Humaninteraction से unrelated।
(b) Consumerchoices सेकभी related नहीं।
(c) Moralright/wrongjudgment।
(d) Amoral/analyticalconcept।
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (d) Amoral/analyticalconcept।
Explanation: Externality is an analytical welfare concept, not a moral judgement about an actor.
व्याख्या: Externality unpricedthirdpartycost/benefit है। “Positive/negative” welfare effect बताते हैं, actor की moral virtue को नहीं।
Question 43 / प्रश्न 43
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Which of the following are correct assumptions of Arrow’s conditions of Social Welfare? A. Responsiveness to individual preferences B. Impositions C. Dicatorship D. Transitivity or consistency E. Independent of irrelevant alternatives
Arrow conditions: A preference-responsiveness; B imposed ordering; C dictatorship; D transitivity; E IIA।
(a) A, B और D केवल
(b) B, D और E केवल
(c) B C और D केवल
(d) A D और E केवल
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (d) A D और E केवल
Explanation: Responsiveness, consistency, and IIA fit the intended desiderata; dictatorship/imposition are their opposites.
व्याख्या: A D E intendeddesiderata हैं; nonimposition/nondictatorship चाहिए, उनके opposites B/C नहीं। Arrow impossibility suitable unrestricted domain, unanimity, IIA और nondictatorship कोसाथ पूरा करने कीसीमा बताता है।
Question 86 / प्रश्न 86
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Given below are two statements. Statement I: Every point on the Contract curve is Pareto efficient because one person could not be made better off without making someone else worse off. Statement II: Every point on the Contract curve necessarily indicates equal level of economic welfare for the society. In light of the above statements,
I Contract curve पर Pareto efficiency; II सभी points पर same/equal welfare।
(a) दोनों सही।
(b) दोनों गलत।
(c) I सही II गलत।
(d) I गलत II सही।
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (c) I सही II गलत।
Explanation: Contract-curve efficiency does not imply identical distribution or social welfare at every point.
व्याख्या: Contract curve efficient allocations की set है। Different points में distribution और social welfare अलग हो सकते हैं। Pareto efficiency equality/social optimality का पूरा मापदंड नहीं।
December2022 · 2March2023 · ShiftII
दिसंबर2022 · 2मार्च2023 · पालीII
Consumer behaviour
उपभोक्ता व्यवहार
Question 1 / प्रश्न 1
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The negative network externality in which a consumer wishes to own an exclusive or unique good such as specially designed sports car is.
Exclusive/unique good कीचाहकी negative network externality?
(a) Bandwagon effect
(b) Tequila effect
(c) Snob effect
(d) Pigou effect
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (c) Snob effect
Explanation: The snob effect reduces demand when ownership becomes less exclusive.
व्याख्या: Snob effect मेंदूसरोंकेपास same good अधिक होने से consumer की demand घटती है। Bandwagon effect मेंदूसरोंके use से demand बढ़ती है।
Question 4 / प्रश्न 4
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The condition of preferring a certain income to a risky income with same expected value is referred to as.
Same expected value पर certain income को risky income से prefer करना ?
(a) Risk neutral।
(b) Riskloving।
(c) Riskaverse।
(d) Riskpremium।
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (c) Riskaverse।
Explanation: Risk aversion favours the certain mean over an appropriate risky lottery.
व्याख्या: Risk averse utility concave होती है: u(EY)>E[u(Y)]fornondegeneraterisk। Certainty equivalent mean income सेकम हो सकता है।
Question 12 / प्रश्न 12
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The demand function for good A is given by QA = 100 – 2PA + 0.2 Y + 0.3 PB. Find the income elasticities of demand PA = 6, Y = 500, PB = 10
QA100−2PA+.2Y+.3PB, PA6, Y500, PB10 में income elasticity?
(a) 0.06
(b) 0.02
(c) 0.52
(d) – 0.06
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (c) 0.52
Explanation: Income elasticity=.2×500/191≈.52.
व्याख्या: QA191; εY=.2×500/191=100/191≈.52356≈.52। Cross price elasticity.016 अलग calculation है।
Question 40 / प्रश्न 40
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Which of the following are true about a fair game or fair bet? A. The entry of a fair bet is zero. B. The person who accepts fair bet is said to be risk lover. C. Expected value of income from the bet is equal to same amount of income with certainty. D. The person who refuses a fair bet is said to be risk neutral. E. The person who refuses a fair bet is said to be risk neutral.
Fair bet: A entry zero; B accepternecessarilyrisklover; C same expected wealth as certain benchmark; D rejecterriskneutral; E rejecterriskneutralduplicate।
(a) A और C केवल
(b) B और E केवल
(c) C और D केवल
(d) C और E केवल
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: कोई exact option नहीं
Explanation: Only Cis clearly true literally; fairness concerns expected net gain, and rejecting risk indicates aversion, not neutrality.
व्याख्या: Fair bet expected NET gain zero कहता है, entry fee necessarily zero नहीं। Risk neutral indifferent होकर accept कर सकता है, so Bnecessarilyfalse। Refusingfairrisk usual risk aversion है, risk neutrality नहीं; D/Etypos हैं। Source(d) तभी intended हैजब E“risk averse”सुधारें।
Question 99 / प्रश्न 99
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In case of two goods for which the MRS is zero or infinite, then the nature of goods is:
MRSzero/infinite arms वाले L-shaped IC में goods?
(a) Perfectsubstitutes।
(b) Normalgoodsnecessarily।
(c) Perfectcomplements।
(d) Closesubstitutes।
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (c) Perfectcomplements।
Explanation: Fixed-proportion complements have horizontal/vertical arms and an undefined MRSat the kink.
व्याख्या: Fixed-proportion complements IC के horizontal/vertical arms पर MRS0/∞और kink पर undefined है। किसी single point पर MRS0/∞ होने से पूरी preferences complements prove नहीं होती ं।
Question 100 / प्रश्न 100
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Which statement is not true? 1 Price effect combines income and substitution effects. 2 For every inferior good, the absolute income effect exceeds the substitution effect. 3 At a usual corner solution, MRSxy differs from p₁/p₂. 4 For a normal good, income and substitution effects both apply.
कौन गलत:1price effect=income+substitution; 2 हर inferior good में income effect dominates; 3usual corner पर MRS≠price-ratio; 4normal good में दोनों effects।
(a) 1
(b) 2
(c) 3
(d) 4
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (b) 2
Explanation: An inferior good need not have an income effect larger than substitution; that dominance is the Giffen case.
व्याख्या: Inferior goods में income effect substitution केविरुद्ध होता है लेकिन हमेशा larger नहीं। Dominant adverse income effect Giffen special case बनाता है। इसलिए statement2false।
Game theory
खेल सिद्धांत
Question 2 / प्रश्न 2
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When each player has chosen his or her optimal strategy given the strategy chosen by other player, the situation is referred to as.
हर player दूसरोंकी strategy दिएअपनी best response चुनेतो?
(a) Nash Equilibrium
(b) Wicksel’s Equilibrium
(c) Prisoner’s dilemma
(d) Co-operative Game
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (a) Nash Equilibrium
Explanation: Nash equilibrium is a profile of mutual best responses.
व्याख्या: Nash equilibrium mutual best responses है: unilateral profitable deviation नहीं। यह joint payoff maximum या fairness की guarantee नहीं।
Market structure and pricing
बाजार संरचना और मूल्य निर्धारण
Question 3 / प्रश्न 3
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C=q³/3−7q²+111q+50 and q=100−P. Find profit-maximising output and maximum profit.
C=q³/3−7q²+111q+50, demandq100−P में q*और max profit?
(a) 50; 100
(b) 111; 2150
(c) 11; 111⅓
(d) 7; 84
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (c) 11; 111⅓
Explanation: Profit−q³/3+6q²−11q−50has its maximum atq11, with profit111⅓.
व्याख्या: π=−q³/3+6q²−11q−50। FOC−q²+12q−11=0 gives1,11; π″=12−2q, so11maximum। π(11)=334/3=111⅓। q0 पर−50 सेभी higher है।
Question 64 / प्रश्न 64
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Match List I with List II.
Oligopoly models match करें।
| ListI सूचीI |
ListII सूचीII |
|---|---|
| A Outputleader output पहलेचुननेवाला |
I Cournot कूर्नो |
| B Simultaneousquantitybestresponse एकसाथ quantitychoice |
II Bertrand बर्ट्रैंड |
| C Kinked-price rigidity kinked मूल्यकठोरता |
III Stackelberg स्टैकेलबर्ग |
| D Simultaneouspricechoice एकसाथ pricechoice |
IV Sweezy स्वीजी |
(a) A-III, B-II, C-IV, D-I
(b) A-II, B-III, C-IV, D-I
(c) A-III, B-I, C-IV, D-II
(d) A-II, B-IV, C-III, D-I
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (c) A-III, B-I, C-IV, D-II
Explanation: The models map to Stackelberg, Cournot, Sweezy, and Bertrand.
व्याख्या: AIII BI CIV DII। Sequential quantity leadership और simultaneous price/quantity models की strategic variables अलग हैं।
Welfare and equilibrium
कल्याण और संतुलन
Question 11 / प्रश्न 11
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Find the producer’s surplus when. Pd = 3×2 – 20x + 5 Ps = 15 + 9x (x is the quantity)
Pd=3q²−20q+5, Ps15+9q में formal producer surplus?
(a) 400
(b) 350
(c) 450
(d) 500
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
Explanation: The positive intersectionq10, p105 gives formal surplus450, but lies on an upward demand branch.
व्याख्या: 3q²−29q−10=0 ⇒positiveq10, p105। PS=½×10×(105−15)=450। इस point पर demand upward-sloping है; standard stable downward-demand market interpretation नहीं। Given functions से formal area answer हीनिकाला है।
Question 31 / प्रश्न 31
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Which of the following is not true in the case of externality?
Externality पर कौन गलत ?
(a) Humaninteractions से linked।
(b) Consumerwelfaresovereigntyframework से linked।
(c) Necessarilymoralright/wrongjudgment।
(d) Amoralanalyticalconcept।
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (c) Necessarilymoralright/wrongjudgment।
Explanation: Externality analysis is not inherently a higher-order moral judgement.
व्याख्या: Externalityunpricedthirdpartyeffect है; harm/benefit क awelfareanalysis म oralcondemnation से अलग है। इसलिए C की necessary moral claim गलत।
Question 32 / प्रश्न 32
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Compensating variation for a price decrease of a good can be interpreted as.
Price fall की compensating variation का interpretation?
(a) Gain पाने के लिए maximum WTP।
(b) Lossbear करने की WTA।
(c) दोनों same।
(d) कोई नहीं।
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (a) Gain पाने के लिए maximum WTP।
Explanation: Compensating variation for a price fall is maximum WTPfor that improvement.
व्याख्या: New lower prices परइतना income लेसकतेहैंकि consumer initial utility परलौटआए। Money amount e(p₀, u₀)−e(p₁, u₀) maximum WTPforpricefall है।
Question 34 / प्रश्न 34
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Equivalent variation for a price increase of a good can be interpreted as.
Price increase की equivalent variation का interpretation?
(a) Increaseavoid करने की maximum WTP।
(b) Increase के बाद compensation WTA।
(c) दोनों same।
(d) कोई नहीं।
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (a) Increaseavoid करने की maximum WTP।
Explanation: Equivalent variation for a price rise is maximum WTPto avoid it at old prices.
व्याख्या: Old prices परकितना income लेनेसे consumer new higher price वाले lower utility तकगिरेगा: e(p₀, u₀)−e(p₀, u₁)। यह price increase avoid करने की WTP है। Actual increase के बाद compensate करना CV होगा।
Production and costs
उत्पादन और लागत
Question 13 / प्रश्न 13
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Find the substitution parameter ρ(rho) of constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function when the elasticity of substitution (σ) is greater than one.
CESσ=1/(1+ρ)>1 मेंρकी range?
(a) ρ = 0
(b) ρ = 1
(c) – 1 < r < 0
(d) 0 < ρ < ∞ 1
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (c) – 1 < r < 0
Explanation: σ=1/(1+ρ)>1requires−1<ρ<0 in this CES convention.
व्याख्या: 1+ρ positive और 1 सेकमहोना चाहिए, इसलिए −1<ρ<0। यही negative-exponent CESparameterisation का result है।
Question 39 / प्रश्न 39
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Which of the following are true for ridge lines? A. They separate the relevant from the irrelevant portions of the isoquants. B. Along the ridge lines, the slope of the isoquants is either zero or infinite. C. The relevant segment of the isoquants encolsed pertains to the stage II of production for labour and capital. D. Producers will never want to operate outside the region enclosed within the ridge lines. E. The marginal product of both inputs- labour and capital is positive but declines for the portion of the isoquants within the ridge lines.
Ridge lines: A relevant boundary; B zero/infinite isoquant slope; C stage IIregion; D positive prices में outside avoid; E positive/diminishing MPusualregion।
(a) A, C और D केवल
(b) B, C और E केवल
(c) A, C, D और E केवल
(d) A, B, C, D और E केवल
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
Explanation: Ridge lines bound the positive-marginal-product region; diminishing products require the usual additional assumptions.
व्याख्या: Ridge lines zero MPboundaries हैं। Inside both MPpositive, sooutput नघटाए input waste avoid कर सकते हैं। Positive MP की definition सेहर production function में diminishing own MPautomatic नहीं; Eusualproductionassumption पर है।
Question 41 / प्रश्न 41
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According to the modern theory of rent. A. All the factors may earn rent B. Rent can only be earned in long-run C. Transfer earning of an unused factor is zero D. Only land can earn rent E. Entire earning of an unused factor is ecnomic rent.
Modern rent: A any factor; B only long run; C otherwise unused factor transfer0; D only land; E zero alternative income पर whole earning rent।
(a) A, B और C केवल
(b) A, C और E केवल
(c) B, C और E केवल
(d) A, C और D केवल
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (b) A, C और E केवल
Explanation: Any factor can earn economic rent; zero alternative earnings make its whole payment rent.
व्याख्या: Economic rent=actual earning−transfer earning। Truly unused elsewhere factor की alternative earning0 होतो whole payment rent। Shortrun quasi rent भी possible है; land exclusive नहीं।
Information economics
सूचना अर्थशास्त्र
Question 69 / प्रश्न 69
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Match List I with List II.
Information/common resource problems match करें।
| ListI सूचीI |
ListII सूचीII |
|---|---|
| A Principalagent प्रधान-अभिकर्ता |
I Overuseresource संसाधनअतिदोहन |
| B Moral hazard नैतिकसंकट |
II Unobservedactions छिपीक्रियाएँ |
| C Commons साझा-संसाधन |
III Employeeownobjective नियोक्तासे अलग लक्ष्य |
| D Lemons निम्नगुणवत्ताबाजार |
IV Sellerknowsqualitymore seller केपासअधिकगुणवत्तासूचना |
(a) A-III, B-II, C-I, D-IV
(b) A-III, B-II, C-IV, D-I
(c) A-IV, B-III, C-I, D-II
(d) A-I, B-II, C-IV, D-III
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (a) A-III, B-II, C-I, D-IV
Explanation: The matching distinguishes agency conflict, hidden action, resource over use, and hidden quality.
व्याख्या: AIII BII CI DIV। Hiddenactionmoralhazard, hiddenqualityadverseselection और open access over use अलग mechanisms हैं।
Question 84 / प्रश्न 84
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Given below are two statements: One is labelled as Assertion A and the other is labelled as Reason R. Assertion A: A form market failure results when products of different qualities are sold at a single price. Reason R: A buyer and a seller possess different information about the product transacted. In the light of the above statements,
A Hiddenqualitygoods एक price पर market failure देसकते; R buyer/seller information अलग।
(a) दोनों सही, Rexplanation।
(b) दोनों सही, Rexplanation नहीं।
(c) A सही R गलत।
(d) A गलत R सही।
Answer & Explanation / उत्तर और व्याख्या
उत्तर: (a) दोनों सही, Rexplanation।
Explanation: Hidden quality and unequal information can drive adverse selection and high-quality seller exit.
व्याख्या: Quality verify न होने पर buyers average price offer करते और high quality sellers exit कर सकते हैं: lemons/adverse selection। Different qualities का single price alone without information problem हमेशा failure नहीं।